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and Equil ibrium in Retailing 
One sort of economic behavior that cont inues to 
engage the a t tent ion of economis ts is the imposi-
tion by some manufac turers of restrictions on 
their wholesalers and retailers. Why would 
manufacturers want to impose minimum retail 
prices, and why would they want to control the 
locations at which their goods are distributed to 
consumers? An applicat ion of simple economic 
principles suggests that manufacturers with a 
monopoly in a p roduc t—th i s could be a monop-
oly achieved through pa ten ts , for example— 
should charge the profit-maximizing wholesale 
price and let retailers fend for themselves . And if 
more stores want to carry the product , so much 
the bet ter , because this increases the likelihood 
that consumers will run across it. 
A widely accepted explanat ion for the desire of 
manufacturers to be able to stipulate resale 
prices is based on the possibility that manufac-
turers of branded goods often want retailers to 
provide some jo in t service that cannot easily be 
charged for. The clearest example is sales or 
promotional effort. The effect of a minimum 
retail price in these cases is to establish an in-
centive to provide joint ly supplied services that 
no individual retailer would otherwise provide. 
This model of distribu-
tion provides a 
rationale for restric-
tions placed on retail-
ers by manufacturers. 
The manufacturer's 
customers are located 
uniformly along a road, 
and retailing operations 
are subject to increas-
ing returns. Three 
difficulties arise. First, 
retailers acting in con-
cert can earn positive 
profits at the expense 
of the manufacturer 
and consumers. Sec-
ond, costless reloca-
tion, free entry, and 
competition will not re-
sult in the store density 
and retail price favored 
by the manufacturer. 
Third, store locations 
fixed in the short run 
imply that price cutting 
would undermine the 
density of stores pre-
ferred by the manufac-
turer. 
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While this explanation appears to be appropriate in the case of goods 
about which consumers are initially ignorant, in many other cases no 
similar joint product seems to be provided. Why have manufacturers 
stipulated minimum resale prices on j eans , candies, sport shirts, and 
numerous other consumer goods that call for little promotional effort at 
the point of sale? 1 
The model developed in this paper looks at another possible source 
of such vertical res t r ic t ions , namely fixed costs in the provision of 
retail services. Under otherwise simple demand and cost condit ions, 
the exis tence of fixed costs can create problems for the manufacturer. 
Restrictions on retail prices and on related aspects of retailer behavior 
serve two purposes in such circumstances. First, they prevent retailers 
from earning profits at the expense of the manufacturer. An organiza-
tion of retailers, a chain s tore, for example, can exploit a manufac-
turer ' s " m o n o p o l y " in a branded good for its own gain and to the dis-
advantage of the manufacturer . Second, these restrictions allow the 
manufacturer to influence the density of retail outlets . Costless reloca-
tion, free entry, and competi t ive retail pricing will not lead to the 
density of outlets and retail prices that maximize manufacturer profits. 
This is t rue despite the fact that retail profits are zero under this re-
gime. Since the analysis here indicates that stores are located too close 
together and charge prices that are too high, maximum retail prices 
provide a way of constraining retailers to the desired combination of 
retail price and densi ty . Yet another difficulty arises from the fixed 
store locations that character ize the short run. With fixed locations the 
possibility exists that s tores will compete for higher returns by displac-
ing existing stores. An important aspect of such rivalry is that it can 
erupt even if stores are making zero profits and have locations and 
prices that are initially consistent with the manufacturer ' s aims. For 
stores satisfying these condit ions, a very small decrease in price by any 
one store (made possible by a small site advantage, say) would force 
losses nearby and, if the investigator perseveres , drive those at neigh-
boring locations out of business . Although this sort of "d i scoun t ing" 
benefits consumers who are near the remaining stores, it hurts the 
manufacturer and o ther consumers . The function of minimum retail 
prices therefore is to prevent price cutting that would undermine the 
spacing of stores desired by the manufacturer. 
1. Telser (1960) presents a careful economic analysis of the service explanation. The 
goods that have been subject to resale price restriction include Levi Strauss jeans, 
Russell Stover candies, Izod sport shirts, Cuisinart food processors, Midas mufflers, 
liquor, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and books. Any experienced shopper will recall 
discovering that nearly all the stores selling some particular branded item sold it for 
exactly the same price. 
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I. Demand and Cost Conditions 
Consider the distr ibution problem facing the manufacturer of a good. 
Identical consumers of this good are distributed uniformly along a 
road, and at each point a long the road they demand q units of the good 
according to the relation q = a - bp*, where p* is the price they face, 
a and b are positive cons t an t s , and we define the relat ionship only for 0 
s= /?* ^ alb. 
Consumers purchase the good at retail outlets that are located along 
the road. The cost of these out lets is governed by the equat ion c = k + 
dQ, where Q is the total quant i ty of the product sold at a s tore and k is 
the fixed avoidable cost and d the marginal cost of opera t ion. The re are 
two reasons for assuming such cost condit ions for retailing. First , 
economies of scale appea r to be the best justification we can offer for 
the fact that the retai lers of a good are located some dis tance apar t . 
Second, any one of several models of inventory holdings suggests that 
economies arise because of the nature of inventory cos ts . Since distri-
bution is carried out by having inventories only at certain poin ts , it 
seems reasonable that these operat ions exhibit increasing re tu rns . Al-
though the precise re la t ionship of output and costs will not be of the 
form c = k + dQ, the key ingredient, increasing returns , is present in 
this mode l . 2 
It will be convenient to make certain simplifying assumpt ions . First , 
a s sume that the product is cost less to produce. Courno t ' s spring water 
will serve as an example . Also assume that t ransporta t ion costs from 
the point of manufacture to the retail outlets are zero. Finally, make 
the marginal retailing cos t s , d, equal to zero. It should be clear that we 
can always consider demand net of these marginal costs and arr ive at 
the same resul ts . Realistic or not , these assumptions make our analysis 
easier without affecting the results. 
Buyers purchase the good at a p r i cep at the store closest to them and 
2. In addition to the theoretical results on inventory holdings, certain empirical 
findings support this view. Cost data presented in a study by the Conference on Price 
Research of the National Bureau of Economic Research (1941. pp. 256-57) show that 
operating expense per dollar of sales declines for drug stores and for meat and grocery 
stores. Although we might argue that there are no economies in retailing because we 
observe different-sized stores existing side by side, it is not at all clear that large and 
small stores are perfect substitutes. And once we introduce transportation costs it is of 
course true that the observed distribution of store sizes, even if these stores provide 
exactly the same service, says very little about the point at which economics of scale are 
exhausted. It should of course also be clear from the discussion here that the model 
considers only the costs of carrying a single item and does not consider the more com-
plex situation that might arise if consumers bought several items in a single trip, as they 
do in the case of grocery shopping. Interestingly, grocery stores are typically free to 
price items as they wish, although goods in the same price range carried by five-and-dime 
stores have frequently been sold at prices that are printed on the container by the 
manufacturer. 
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incur shopping costs of ts in order to take home one unit of the good a 
distance s to where they reside. Since quantity demanded depends on 
the delivered price, the quantity consumed at any point will be q = a 
- b{p + ts) where p* = p + ts. Obviously, the efficient assignment of 
a given number of s tores to the road will call for each store to be 
located at the midpoint of the interval which it serves. These intervals 
will also be equal for all s tores. Exceptions to this rule will occur if the 
road is not infinitely long or if it is not an integer multiple of a certain 
length. These except ions are not the prime concern, however , and they 
will be ignored. 
How should the shopping costs be interpreted? In this model they 
can be thought of as the costs consumers incur in traveling to the 
nearest s tore, buying the good, and returning home. This seems to be 
all that is required to justify the assumption of significant shopping 
costs for the consumer and negligible transportation costs for the re-
tailer who buys his goods in bulk at the factory gate. Shopping costs 
are a substantial fraction of the full cost of most consumer items. A 
broader interpretation, however, is that these costs allow us to repre-
sent situations in which the likelihood that a consumer will buy a 
particular branded good increases as the density of retail outlets in-
creases . 
Adopt the convention for a typical interval that the store is located at 
the point zero and that the interval it serves is [-s, s]. If this store 
charges p per unit and serves the interval [ — s, s], how much will it 
sell? Define this amount as Q(p, s), so that we have 
Q(p, s) = 2 f [a - b(p + tcr)} do 
Jo ( I ) 
= 2s (a - bp) - bts . 
One implication of this relationship is that if we expand the territory of 
a store (while maintaining a fixed price), a point will be reached at 
which the quantity purchased reaches a maximum. Since we have 
= 2 (a - bp) - 2 bts, (2) 
ds 
this occurs when a = b {p + ts) or when demand is choked off because 
of the high delivered price. Note also that since p > 0 we restrict our 
attention to intervals for which s < albt. 
Suppose our manufacturer operates only one retail outlet on the 
road. What price would he charge and how far would his territory 
extend? From a practical standpoint this is an uninteresting situation, 
but it will serve to establish some analytical points and illustrate what 
may seem to be the opportunities facing a single retailer. Since profit is 
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simply total r evenue less total cost , we can define it as quant i ty sold 
t imes the per unit pr ice , less fixed costs: 
-TT = Q(p, s) p - k 
(3) 
= [2s(a - bp) — bts2] p - k. 
Regardless of the price charged , we know that a single outlet will serve 
buyers along the road until the point is reached where the amoun t 
demanded vanishes . Set (2) equal to zero so that we obtain s = (a — 
bp)lbt and subst i tute this into (3). Consequent ly we have 
(a - bp)2 , 
TT - - i — b t 1 p - k (4) 
and 
d-rr (a - 3bp) (a - bp) 
dp bt 
(5) 
Obviously (5) will be ze ro ei ther for p = a/3b or p = alb. Since (4) is 
concave for 0 < p < 2a/3b, the first point represents a max imum. (The 
second point , p = alb, is a minimum that occurs when quant i ty and 
revenue are ze ro . Fo r higher prices we would get negative quanti t ies 
and negative d is tances but for the fact that we have defined ou r de-
mand curve only for 0 *£ p alb). The optimal interval for this price 
will reach out to 5 = 2a/3bt in each direction, and the interval will have 
a length equal to 4a/3bt. 
It is useful to ant ic ipate some results at this point. Firs t , the possibil-
ity that we can use more s tores will in general require shor ter intervals 
since we have implicitly assumed that extra stores are infinitely costly. 
It is also apparent that independent retailers would prefer not to have 
competi t ion at their borders but that they will usually be in a position to 
impose externali t ies on each other through invasions of terr i tory. Note 
that we also have a b reak-even condition for the value of k. F o r non-
trivial solut ions to the maximizat ion problem we have p = a/3b and 
5 = 2al3bt. Subs t i tu te these values into (3) and impose the condit ion 
that TT > 0. It then tu rns out that we must have 
k < -K- (6) 
27b2t 
in order for profits to be greater than zero . 
Finally, cons ider the case in which a manufacturer designates a re-
tailer who may opera te only one store. For a given wholesale price w 
the profit oppor tuni t ies facing this retailer are defined by 
TT' = [2s(a - bp) - bts2](p - w) - k. 
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In general the profit-maximizing solution of the retailer will call for a 
higher price and a shor te r interval. For example, the optimal distance 
to the border will be 
2a 2w . 
3bt 3t ' 
that is, the dis tance is a l inear function of w, and it is shorter than for 
the integrated manufacturer/retai ler operating the same s tore . This il-
lustrates one source of difficulty for the manufacturer, in part icular that 
the retai ler 's incentives are inconsistent with what the manufacturer 
wants or even with what would maximize their joint profits. It is the 
analog in a spatial context of the result in a more familiar setting that a 
monopolist buying from a monopolist will raise the price above what it 
would be for a single, vertically integrated monopolist . In that case 
efficient (single-price) monopoly calls for vertical integration or some 
sort of vertical restraint . Essentially similar results emerge for the 
spatial market . 
II. Vertically Integrated Distribution 
The case jus t analyzed in which a manufacturer has only a single store 
is most emphatically not the problem a manufacturer faces. One possi-
ble course of act ion will call for the manufacturer to run his own retail 
organization composed of many stores, which some manufacturers do. 
What character izes the solution to this retailing problem? In our case 
we see that the manufac turer will be concerned with maximizing profit 
per unit distance.3 Consequen t ly , in place of (3), the manufacturer will 
look at 
TT/S = [2{a - bp) - bts] p - kls, (7) 
and his aim will be to pick an interval [-s, s] and a price p that 
maximizes the value of this function. First-order condit ions for (7) a r e 4 
3. Since the length of the line is fixed, maximizing profits per unit distance implies the 
same solution as maximizing profits over the whole length of the line by picking the 
optimal number of equidistant stores. 






= -2k/s3 < 0 
= -4b < 0. 
We also have d2{irls)/dsdp = - bt < 0. By the second-order test for an extremum, points 
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dQrr/g) 
ds 




= 2a - 4bp - bts = 0. (9) 
The first condition says that the savings that come from spreading the 
fixed costs k over a greater distance should just equal losses of revenue 
per unit distance that come with greater distance. The second sets 
marginal revenue over the internal equal to ze ro . It sets the gain in 
marginal revenue coming from consumers located directly at the store 
equal to the loss occurr ing at the margin over the length of the interval. 
Expressed as functions of p, these two conditions are 
The solid lines in figure 1 represent these two equat ions . In general the 
optimal policy from the manufacturer 's point of view calls for each 
identical store to serve a smaller market and to charge a higher price 
than if he were operat ing only a single store by himself. The optimal 
solution will lie among (9') and move leftwards and up as the fixed 
retailing costs dec rease . 
HI. Coordinated Distribution Outlets 
In many c i rcumstances it is impractical, which is to say cost ly, for 
manufacturers to manage their own retail out le ts . Suppose now that 
the manufacturer simply sets a retail price w and lets anyone who 
would like to do so set up a store at one or more locations. Are there 
profit opportunit ies for retailers under such a regime? It turns out that 
the re are . What is more , these profits are won partially at the manufac-
where both partial derivatives are zero and the second partials are negative represent a 
maximum if 
p = klbts2 (8') 
and 
(9') 
which is our case requires 
s < 
br ' 
Call the interval for which this holds [0, s']. This is a sufficient condition for a maximum. 
It is easy to show, however, that of the two solutions implied by (8) and (9), only one falls 
in this interval, while the other is a saddle point. 
turer ' s expense. To investigate these points, the initial focus will be on 
the maximum joint re turns available to retailers as a group (the max-
imum return to retailers per unit distance). This will answer the ques-
tion of what an exclusive but otherwise unrestricted retail organization 
would do. Later we will explore the question of how closely a set of 
retail outlets can approximate this solution without being awarded 
the exclusive franchise but simply by placing stores at the proper loca-
tions. 
Our retail organization is concerned with maximizing returns per 
unit distance. Consequent ly we have 
•n/s = [2{a - bp) - bts] (p - w) - k/s, (10) 
which implies the following first-order conditions: 
- bt (p - w) + k/s2 = 0 (11) 
and 
[2(a - bp) - bts] + (p - w)(- lb) = 0, (12) 
since the aim is to pick the values of p and s that maximize iris. These 




These equations are shown in figure 1 for two cases , w equal to zero 
and w equal to some posi t ive value. In general , of course , the solution 
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to this set of equa t ions implies a different price and store ter r i tory than 
we found for the vertically integrated manufacturer/retai ler , except in 
the case where w equals z e r o . 5 Fo r a large enough k it is c lear that a 
retail organizat ion that takes up locations and that charges prices as 
determined by these equa t ions will also prevent any would-be entrants 
from making profits so long as it holds to this policy. Consequen t ly , the 
strategy that maximizes retailing re turns per unit d is tance is a lso invul-
nerable except to manufac turer act ion. 
It is possible to gain a be t ter unders tanding of the general condi t ions 
under which a retail organizat ion can earn positive profits. F i r s t , exam-
ine the condi t ions unde r which TT = [2s(a - bp) - bts2](p - w) - kis 
equal to ze ro . N o t e first that since we are concerned with the pos-
sibilities available to retailers for arbi trary values of w, and since 
raising vv is equivalent to lowering the value of a, we can set w = 0 
without affecting the analysis . An explicit solution to this equat ion is 
still t ed ious , howeve r , because it involves quadrat ic t e r m s . But by 
means of the quadra t ic formula and the implicit-function rule we can 
establish the following. First , expressed as a function of p, t he solution 
is p = allb - ts/4 p lus or minus a complicated term involving the other 
pa ramete r s and k. Second , it turns out that dplds = 0 w h e r e the func-
tion intersects p = alb - ts, and dplds = ^ where it in tersects p = 
allb - tslA. T h e s e resul ts are represented in figure 2. Obviously, a 
lower k will imply a grea ter range for p and s over which profits are 
nonnegat ive . 
H o w do we charac te r ize the opportunit ies available to would-be 
ent rants? The bes t possible location is halfway be tween the existing 
s tores . For any given price p and distance to the boa rde r s for the 
existing out lets we also have some optimal price and (implied) distance 
to the border , call them p and s, for ent rants . The boundar ies between 
existing s tores and en t ran t s is given by the solution to 
p + ts = p + t{s - s). (13) 
This in turn implies that entrants will at tempt to choose values of p 
(and by implicat ion s) that maximizes TT = [2s(a - bp) - bts2]p - k, 
subject to (13). N o t e that (13) can be rewritten as 
and that dsldp = - 1/2/. Consequent ly , we can der ive the first-order 
condit ion simply for dTtldp instead of working out the resul ts of a con-
5. Clearly, the integrated retailer/manufacturer and the exclusive retail chain facing a 
wholesale price of zero would adopt the same retail price and the same intervals. This 
explains why the solid lines in fig. 1 describe the first-order conditions for both problems. 
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strained maximization p rob lem. Starting out with 
TT = 2s{a ~ bp - \r bts) p - k, 
we have 
JJL = 2-4^- (a - bp - \bts)p + 2s(a - bp - -Uts) 
dp dp 2 2 
+ 2sp ( - b - ]-bt —); 
2 dp 
and since r).?/d/? = - M2t, we obta in , after some rear rangement , 
pi ^Aj - p(JL + 3.v/,j + 2.v« - bts2 = 0. 
By the implicit function rule , 
-§L = (- 3bp + 2a - W " y " 3fl>), 
which implies that a m a x i m u m is reached when p = 2a/3b - 2/.v/3 is 
equal t o p = «/2/? - /.v/4, or w h e r e .v = 6a/l5bt. These results are a lso 
displayed in figure 2. T h e locus of maximizat ion points (shown by the 
dotted line) is related to the equilibrium points in what has come to be 
called Hotell ing-Smithies compet i t ion , in which each firm maximizes 
profits taking the locat ions and prices of its neighbors as given (see the 
analysis by Capozza and Van Order [ 19781). Instead of represent ing an 
FIG. 2 
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P.P 
p + 2 t s = m 
FIG. 3 
equil ibrium, howeve r , we interpret the locus of points as the best pos-
sible response of en t ran t s to an existing retail monopoly, conditional 
on the retail monopoly maximizing profits without the threat of entry in 
mind. Intuit ion in this case does suggest, however, that it will always 
be possible for the existing retail organization to adopt pr ices and 
locations that will successfully thwart entry. This may entail some 
sacrifice in profits, but at a low enough price and a short enough store 
terr i tory, potential en t ran ts will have to suffer losses and be dis-
couraged from enter ing. 
This can be shown with the aid of figure 3. The loop represents for a 
given value of k the locus of zero profits for either existing firms or 
en t ran ts . We also have the relationship between the possible combina-
tions of and border d is tances of existing firms on the one hand and the 
same variables for new entrants on the other. This is given by p + ts -
p + Its. The existing firm can pick a value for the left-hand side, say m, 
and this de te rmines the overall value of the right-hand side. Dia-
grammatical ly , it means that combinations of p and .v can always be 
chosen that result in posit ive profits inside TT = 0, while at the same 
time implying losses for the would-be entrants . The practical implica-
tion of this analysis is that it provides a possible explanation for the 
refusal of some manufacturers to allow chain stores to handle their 
p roduc t s . By choosing the appropriate prices and dis tances between 
s tores , and making the establishment of competing stores unprofitable, 
a chain s tore could appropria te some of the profit that would otherwise 
go to the manufac ture . Again, " d i s t a n c e " should be unders tood as 
economic d i s tance , so that transportat ion costs can be used to repre-
sent search and shopping costs . 
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IV. Competitive Retailers 
Obviously, the manufacturer will not be happy if his distr ibution is 
carried on by a retail monopoly since, with the same retail price and a 
higher density of s tores, his sales at the constant wholesale price will 
be increased. One course of action calls for him to let only those 
merchants handle his product who behave " c o m p e t i t i v e l y . " This is, 
however , also not the ideal situation. A verbal summary of the results 
in this section suggests why this is so. A competi t ive equilibrium in 
spatial competi t ion is characterized by two condit ions: profits are zero 
and marginal costs equal marginal revenue. It turns out , however , that 
the na ture of the behavioral assumption chosen will govern the form of 
each retailer 's demand curve and hence each retai ler 's marginal reve-
nue . So, for example, Loschian competition implies relatively s teep 
demand curves , because each retailer imagines himself to be operat ing 
in an exclusive market area with no competit ion at the borders . In 
contras t , Hotelling-Smithies competi t ion implies flatter demand 
curves , because each retailer believes that his neighbors ' prices and 
locations are fixed. An even more ext reme assumption results in still 
flatter demand curves , because retailers imagine the price they face at 
their boundaries to be fixed. Consequently, while there is only one 
opt imum combination of retail price and interval length, there are a 
number of combinations implied by the various solution concep t s and 
no clear consensus about which should be preferred. For tunate ly for 
the analysis here, the range of price-interval combinat ions implied by 
these solution concepts does not include the solution preferred by the 
manufacturer. So, although I argue for the use of the concept that 
brings about the lowest prices and longest intervals plausible under 
monopolist ic competi t ion, the resulting prices are still t oo high and 
intervals too short to please the manufacturer. 
The easiest way to explore these issues is with the aid of a diagram. 
Figure 4 presents the locus of points for a particular set of pa ramete r 
values for which profits are equal to zero. If stores can be moved easily 
(if they are on roller-skates) and collusion among outlets is not per-
mitted, then entry will take place until profits are zero , that is, until 
s tore locations and retail prices conform to one of the combinat ions in 
the southwest segments of IT = 0. The second condition will call for 
changes in price at a particular store to result in negative profits. The 
assumpt ion that stores can be moved costlessly together with the as-
sumption of free entry and independent pricing implies that the price a 
store faces at its border is fixed. Call this price p°. Consequent ly , the 
dis tance to the border for any price p is found as the solution to p + ts 
= p°. More important , this relation implies that dplds = - / . I n te rms 
of figure 4, it has the interpretation that the monopolistic compet i t ion 
equilibrium occurs where TT = 0 has a slope of -t. Unde r these as-
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P 
Monopolistic Optimal s 
Competit ion Density 
FIG. 4 
sumpt ions , profits are maximized, but they are also equal to zero . This 
is what C a p o z z a and Van Order (1978) call Greenhut -Ohta compet i -
tion. 
At least two o ther solution concepts are also a possibility, but since 
they imply an even larger discrepancy between the competi t ive solu-
tion and what the manufac turer wants , and since they have been devel-
oped e l sewhere , I will provide only a brief statement of the results . 
Hotell ing-Smithies compet i t ion , in which firms believe that s tore loca-
tions are fixed and that their competi tors do not respond with price 
changes , implies dplds - -It, which together with a zero profits con-
straint, calls for even shor ter intervals and higher prices. Loschian 
compet i t ion, an ex t r eme case , implies the shortest intervals compatible 
with retailers breaking e v e n . 6 Although it carries no consequences for 
what follows, I will express my preference for the Greenhut-Ohta alter-
nat ive, because it does not imply that firms believe locations to be fixed 
when in fact entry and relocation are a crucial part of long-run equilib-
rium. It more nearly cap tures the spirit of "pr ice tak ing" because an 
individual firm, very small relative to the market , that decides to raise 
or lower its price will only have the effect of moving its neighbors 
closer or farther away as it raises or lowers its prices. Other firms, even 
the immediate ne ighbors , will not suffer or gain in any way. The move-
ment of firms along the line will simply be stimulated by small changes 
in price that are communica ted down an endless chain. Gran ted , there 
is an inconsis tency for lines of finite length, but this should be no more 
troubling than similar inconsistencies in the standard compet i t ive 
model . 
These are the compet i t ive solutions. What is the optimal policy for 
6. The isomorphism between these three concepts and the competitive, Cournot, and 
monopoly solutions to the standard textbook problem is worth noting. 
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the manufacturer? The total quant i ty sold by a store is Q = 2s(a - bp) 
- bts2, which implies that quant i ty per unit distance is T = Q/s = 2{a 
- bp) - bts. The objective of a manufacturer , for any given wholesale 
price, is to maximize this quant i ty . Rearranging terms, we obtain 
a T 1 
P = - b - ^ b - - - 2 1 S 
as the line describing, for any given quantity per unit d is tance , the 
combinations of p and 5 that yield that quantity per unit d is tance. The 
manufacturer 's problem can be thought of as one of constrained max-
imization: maximize T subject to TT 0. In terms of figure 4 it means 
that the manufacturer would call for longer intervals and lower prices 
than implied by the most favorable form of monopolistic competi t ion 
and, a fortiori, by Hotelling-Smithies or Loschian competi t ion. 
It can be verified that this maximization problem results in the same 
retail price and interval lengths as the integrated manufacturer/retailer 
in Section II would prefer. Set up the following Lagrangian problem: 
Pick values of p, s, and w to maximize manufacturer revenues per unit 
distance subject to retailers jus t breaking even. Formally, 
L = [2(a - bp) - bts]w + k {[2(a - bp) - bts] (p - w) - k/s}. 
Two of the resulting first-order condi t ions are the same as (8) and (9), 
giving the solution to the vertically integrated maximization problem, 
and the remaining two set A. = 1 (the value of an extra dollar of reve-
nue) and establish w conditional on the values of p and s (by means of 
the break-even constraint) . 
V. Restrictions on Retailers and the Short Run 
It becomes clear from the foregoing discussion that there is no auto-
matic tendency for systems of retailing to emerge that serve the manu-
facturer 's purpose. Retail operat ions that are run collusively have the 
effect of reducing the manufac turer ' s profit, as does competi t ive retail-
ing with free entry and easy relocat ion, since both result in less sold per 
unit distance for any given wholesale price. 
Two possible solutions to the manufacturer ' s problem as stated so 
far suggest themselves. The manufacturer might try to achieve the 
optimal retail price and density of s tores by specifying maximum retail 
prices or by specifying a limit to the number of stores. A limit to the 
number of stores has the implication, however , that under any of the 
three plausible behavioral assumpt ions discussed, prices would rise. 
Since dplds =s - / under these assumpt ions , firms will imagine, cor-
rectly as it turns out, that their profits will increase with increases in 
price. An upper limit on prices , however , would prevent this behavior . 
Surprisingly, perhaps , this analysis suggests that manufacturers should 
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be interested in imposing m a x i m u m , and not minimum, retail pr ices . 
There are in fact instances whe re just such a st ipulation has been 
m a d e . 7 
Until this point the analysis has been about the long run. Stores 
relocate in response to price changes and move cost lessly. But it s eems 
sensible to look at what happens when store locations are fixed. This is 
an ex t reme case of costly re locat ion , but it provides some discipline to 
the problem. The familiar model of competit ive equil ibrium makes the 
same dist inction: The n u m b e r of firms and firm capaci t ies are fixed in 
the short run but variable in the long run. 
The difficulty that arises at this point is general to all sets of fixed 
locations and prices that result in ze ro profits. As already ment ioned , 
there are obvious evils that c o m e with fixed locations and the apparen t 
temptat ion to raise pr ices , s ince this permits the retailer to exploit the 
manufac turer ' s monopoly to his own benefit. Fixing locat ions makes it 
reasonable to suppose , in fact, that prices will be increased according 
the Loschian assumpt ion since s tore territories are fixed. But with a 
specified max imum retail pr ice this problem would not exist . A new 
danger , however , arises from the possibility of retailers lowering 
pr ices . Before, under the Greenhu t -Ohta assumption that was used to 
character ize the long run, price decreases resulted in the movement of 
neighboring firms so that the price at the border s tayed cons tan t . N o w , 
however , a lower retail price must imply that a firm that lowers prices 
will incur losses and force its neighbors to incur losses as well. Within 
the confines of the formal model the outcome of this sort of struggle is 
indeterminate , s ince firms initially have equal retail pr ices , equal cos t s , 
and equal terr i tor ies . In prac t ice , however , any slight advantage at one 
store (such as greater demand or lower costs) will allow it to win a 
batt le with its neighbors . M o r e important , the surviving firm will have 
greater profits, even if it obse rves the manufacturer ' s stipulated max-
imum price, because it gains the ext ra demand forfeited by its former 
compet i tors . T o prevent th i s , the manufacturer can institute and 
enforce a sys tem of minimum retail prices. This keeps would-be dis-
counters from driving their compet i tors out of business and from dis-
rupting the optimal density of retail outlets. 
VI. Concluding Comments 
The argument advanced in this paper has not been incorporated in the 
economic l i terature on vertical restrictions and resale price mainte-
7. For example, Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram & Sons (1951) and Albrecht v. Herald Co. 
(1968). Clearly, manufacturers can often establish what amounts to a maximum price by 
printing a price on the package, suggesting to consumers that some other store may carry 
the item at that price even if this one marked it up. 
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nance, although certain similarities to work on other topics should be 
noted. 8 The formal model has close relatives in the literature on spatial 
competition, and the analysis is related also to the theory of economic 
regulation, as a comparison of the model here with that due to Telser 
(1969) will reveal. The common element is of course increasing returns , 
and indeed the model here suggests that vertical integration and verti-
cal restraints can be viewed as the private regulation of an economic 
organization that does not, or cannot , achieve efficient competi t ive 
ou tcomes . 9 
There are many ways in which the simple s tructure of this model 
could fruitfully be elaborated. Clearly, an explicit t reatment of inven-
tories and consumer search behavior would be a desirable im-
provement. The analysis of inventories and equilibrium due to Gould 
(1978) suggests ways of doing this. A more complete model could prob-
ably tell us more about the economics of vertical restr ict ions. For 
example, it might explain why such restrictions often include minimum 
limits on prices but only rarely specify maximum prices. It would also 
be desirable to treat the transition from short to long run with a better-
formulated dynamic mechanism. 
A more detailed look at consumer search may illuminate the relation-
ship between branded goods and the reputat ion of retail outlets that 
carry them. An intuitively plausible, but undeveloped, explanation for 
resale price maintenance in the case of some goods is that certain 
manufacturers want only prestige s tores with high overhead to carry 
their goods. This is related to the service argument , since manufactur-
ers want some service provided that cannot be charged for directly. 
This line of thought is intriguing, but has yet to be developed in the 
context of an explanation that assumes rational self-interest, including 
some optimal degree of ignorance, on the part of firms and consumers . 
In contrast to the service argument , it is not clear what is being pro-
vided by the high-priced retailer, or why the existence of discounters 
carrying the same good would prove to be against the interest of the 
manufacturer. 
Some comments are also in order concerning the question of monop-
oly, represented here as downward-s loping demand for the manufac-
turer 's product. Clearly there are many areas in which this occurs , 
publishing being a case in point. Yet we at tach no overriding welfare 
significance to the fact that the publ isher of a best-seller has a monop-
oly. This is generally justified on the grounds that the author and pub-
8. Since writing the first draft of this paper I have discovered that G. F. Mathewson 
and R. A. Winter (1982) have also employed a model of spatial competition to analyze 
vertical restrictions on retailers. Although I think the spirit of their analysis is similar to 
mine, the two papers diverge at several points. 
9. The effect of minimum resale prices on the number of retail outlets has been long 
noted in the institutional literature. See, e.g., Kuipers (1950, pp. 107-16). 
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lisher must be guaranteed some way of recouping their cos t s , even if 
the a r rangement violates the marginal conditions for an op t imum. 
The suspicion that downward-sloping demand for the produc t and 
fixed costs are crucial ingredients is confirmed by the early history of 
the sugar indust ry . The American Sugar Refining C o m p a n y and its 
p redecessor the Sugar Trust maintained a wholesale price agreement 
with the Wholesa le Groce r s ' Association beginning in 1889. " S o keen 
was the compet i t ion be tween wholesale grocers that sugar was regu-
larly being sold at cost or below; and, in order to restore a more 
reasonable condi t ion of affairs, they sought and obta ined from the 
refining c o m p a n y an agreement under which sugar was bought and sold 
by wholesa lers at a uniform price per pound, with a reba te to all who 
maintained that p r i c e " (Haney 1913, p . 159). While it might be argued 
that the manufac turer , who had a very large market share at this t ime, 
was the ca t ' s -paw for a wholesalers ' cartel, another sensible explana-
tion is that a s table distribution network served the manufac ture r ' s 
interest . O the rwise , one would have to explain why a powerful manu-
facturer acquiesced to a scheme that raised distribution cos t s . Inter-
estingly, the theory here also suggests that the retailing problems that 
arise when the re are fixed costs in retailing should be j u s t as formidable 
for a perfectly compet i t ive industry producing a homogeneous good. 
This p rov ides an explanat ion for joint efforts on the part of manufac-
turers to impose resale prices on the industry 's p r o d u c t s . 1 0 
The pract ical insights of the formal model a re probably best 
elucidated by taking the manufacturer ' s perspect ive. Fo r example , a 
little reflection about the distribution problem of a publ isher suggests 
that for a given wholesale price, profits are greater if more books tores 
carry his books and if the retail price is lowered. These two des idera ta 
are inversely related, however , and the purpose of a margin set by the 
publisher is to induce more outlets to carry his publ icat ions. If o ther 
books tores are permit ted to carry the book and if average inventory 
costs dec rease with sales, retailing will not result in supracompet i t ive 
re turns . Moreove r , if the manufacturer sets the correct resale pr ice , 
retailing will be carried out efficiently. It may be useful to cons ider the 
10. A study of resale price maintenance in the United Kingdom observes that "it is 
commonly assumed that resale price maintenance technique can only apply to the trade 
in branded products. . . . In fact, however, the prerequisite . . . is rather that the 
product concerned should be sufficiently homogeneous" (Kuipers 1950, p. 12). The 
author cites motor vehicles and dental goods as items for which manufacturers agreed on 
a system of minimum retail prices (p. 63). In the grocery trade, resale prices on at least 66 
categories of goods, including baking powder, cornflour, and vinegar, were protected 
through the efforts of the Grocery Proprietary Articles Council, an organization of manu-
facturers (pp. 144-45). It is not clear from the author's discussion whether identical 
prices were charged for, say, two brands of baking powder, but it seems odd in any case 
that they would endorse each other's attempt to maintain retail prices, quite aside from 
whether the two had a cartel at the wholesale level. 
494 Journal of Business 
al te rna t ive . W h a t would happen and whose interests would be served if 
the publ isher of a best -sel ler set only a wholesale price and let book-
stores pr ice the book as they wished? It is not far-fetched to imagine 
that d iscount mai l -order sales of books would soon account for a large 
fraction of book sales and that the function that bookstores have of 
lowering c o n s u m e r search costs would no longer be served, because 
such s tores would no longer be profitable. It also seems safe to say that 
publishing is in no fundamental economic sense unique, ei ther in its 
cost condi t ions or its market ing p rob l em. " 
N o w it has to be granted that vertical restrictions, especially resale 
price ma in tenance , a re not as widely used as the model might suggest. 
In par t this has to be at t r ibuted to the hostile legal e n v i r o n m e n t . 1 2 
Resale price ma in tenance has in the past been widely used in the 
Uni ted S ta tes , the Uni ted Kingdom, and many European countr ies . 
H o w e v e r , seen in the absence of legal restrictions, one would not 
expect it to be used universal ly for a number of reasons. To illustrate, 
the use of such a mechan i sm to enforce efficient distribution is not 
cost less . Manufac ture rs incur monitoring and enforcement cos ts , with 
enforcement carr ied out largely by terminating dealers and disrupting 
the retailing organizat ion. In such cases the losses that come from an 
inefficient retail dis t r ibut ion may be outweighed by the gains that come 
from not having to keep t rack of hundreds or thousands of retailers and 
occasionally terminat ing them. Consequent ly , one expects vertical re-
strictions more often whe re the ideal number of retail outlets is less and 
where the cost of shifting business from one outlet to another is not 
great . Another var ie ty of loss occurs because retailers lose the discre-
tion to respond to local c i rcumstances . If retail prices are fixed, retail-
ers canno t respond to local seasonal fluctuations or practice the sort of 
inter temporal pr ice discr iminat ion that special sales seem to imply. 
Other implications follow from the role played by transportat ion 
11. Not all the copies of a book are sold at the same price, of course, and even best-
sellers are discounted (slightly) by book clubs. As is well known, publishers themselves 
practice intertemporal price discrimination through paperback sales. The crucial ques-
tion, however, is why book prices are not determined by the bookseller for the bulk of 
new sales. This is particularly true for academic books, for example. U. af Trolle (Yamey 
1966, p. 105) notes that resale price maintenance made its first appearance in Europe in 
publishing. Yamey (1966, p. 252) summarizes the early history of the practice for publish-
ing in the United Kingdom. An intriguing aspect of this history is that it was abandoned 
in 1852 because of public opinion and revived in the 1890s, with Marshall's Principles of 
Economics among the first books to be marketed this way again. 
12. It is not quite true that resale price maintenance is now illegal, although it is 
strongly discouraged. A great deal seems to hinge on whether the price is established 
through an agreement or mere "jawboning." Although it is generally acknowledged to be 
an unsettled area of the law, where manufacturers are advised to tread delicately ("When 
the occasion arises, legal advice should be obtained," counsels Hancock [1979. chap. 11, 
p. 15]), as a practical matter resale price maintenance has recently been used for a 
number of goods (see Taylor 1980). 
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costs . These can be thought of not merely as the literal costs of t ravel-
ing to the neares t store and returning home but also as the diminished 
likelihood of purchase that comes with a lower density of s tores car ry-
ing an i tem. Since as transportation costs decrease the model ap -
proaches the s tandard competit ive case and the losses from unre-
stricted compet i t ion and entry diminish, one would expect the pract ice 
to be used more frequently, either where actual t ranspor ta t ion cos ts 
are large or where the product is new or the class of potential buyers is 
constantly turning over . Consequent ly , resale price maintenance was 
used for ball point pens and food processors when these were first 
in t roduced, but is still used for a well-established brand of candy that is 
often made a gift, presumably by husbands and boyfriends w h o were at 
their wi ts ' ends about what to buy for that special occasion. 
Yet ano the r important influence limiting the use of vertical restr ic-
tions lies outs ide the formal model. Largely as a result of higher in-
comes and the development of self-service s tores, the typical con-
sumer buys many i tems during a single shopping expedi t ion . 
Competi t ion be tween grocery stores is carried out by taking into ac-
count the character is t ics of consumers and appealing to a part icular 
group with favorable prices for particular bundles of goods . Res t r ic-
tions on resale prices would prevent this sort of compet i t ion , and re-
tailers would turn to manufacturers without this restr ic t ion. It is not 
surprising to discover , for example, that many of the i tems that a re 
commonly priced independently by supermarkets today were sold 
under resale price maintenance when it was not unusual for house-
wives to visit three or four different stores to do their grocery shop-
ping. 1 3 Ano the r way of viewing the issue is to say that for most grocery 
items an individual retailer will not be deterred from carrying a good if 
it is d iscounted nearby, since his usual clientele will not bother to 
switch s to res , even for the discounted item. 
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